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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
"SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE" WITH MUNICIPAL TORT
NOTICE REQUIREMENTS: GALBREATH v. CITY OF
INDIANAPOLIS
Numerous states have statutes requiring that notice specifying cir-
cumstances of an injury must be served on designated officials before a
tort action may be brought against a municipality.' This special treat-
ment originated to protect the municipality from stale and fraudulent
claims, provide an opportunity for timely investigation, and permit settle-
ment of claims without the expense of needless litigation.' Although
there is no general rule for interpretation of these statutes,' Indiana,
until recently, has demanded strict compliance with that portion of its
tort notice statute governing which officials must be notified. Whether
a court "strictly" or "liberally" construes the notice requirement is sig-
nificant since a valid notice is a prerequisite to hearing the merits of the
case.
4
The Indiana statute requires notice to either the mayor, clerk, or
clerk-treasurer of the city or town.' However, in Galbreath v. City of
1. See e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. cl. 24, § 1-4-2 (Smith-Hurd 1962); IowA CODE ANN.§ 420.45 (1949).
2. 2 M. MERRILL, MERRILL ON NOTICE § 784 (1952), E. MCQUILLIN, 18 MUNICIPAL
CORPORATiONs: § 53.153 (3rd ed. rev. 1963) [hereinafter cited as MCQuiLUNJ. Aaron
v. City of Tipton, 218 Ind. 227, 32 N.E.2d 88 (1941).
3. Antieau, Statutory Expansion of Municipal Tort Liability, 4 ST. Louis L.J. 351,
353 (1957) ; MCQUILLIN note 2 supra, at § 53.152; Borchard, Government Liability in
Tort, 34 YALE L.J. 1 ,44 (1924). Thus, if a statute is in derogation of common law
immunity, it will receive a narrow construction; if there was no common law immunity
it will receive a liberal construction. See City of Tulsa v. Whittenhall, 140 Okla. 160, 282
P. 322 (1929).
4. Borchard, Report of the Comninittee on Municipal Tort Liability, 7 AI. Mux. L.
Rav. 250, 253 (1942) [hereinafter cited as REPORT].
5. However, when the Galbreath case arose, the statute listed only the mayor and
clerk. IND. ANN. STAT. § 48-8001 (Burns Repl. 1963) provided in part:
Hereinafter no action or actions of any kind for damages arising from any
negligence . . . or other tort of any municipal corporation that causes injury
to any person . . . shall be brought or maintained against any municipal cor-
poration of this state unless there is first served upon the mayor or clerk of
any such city or a member of the board of trustees of any such town, either by
delivery thereto in person or by registered mail with return card, a written
notice of the occurrence complained of, setting out therein a brief general
description of the date and time, the place, the conditions and cause, the nature
and extent of the injury to person and loss, injury or damage, if any, to property,
the date and cause of any resulting death charged as wrongful and the nature
of the damages arising to anyone therefrom, all as associated with and caused
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Indianapolis' the Indiana Supreme Court, overturning long-standing
precedent, held that "substantial compliance" with the Statute was suf-
ficient. Application of this standard resulted in a finding that letters to a
legal department investigator and conversations with him and the city
attorney satisfied the notice requirement.7 The court based its deter-
mination that the city attorney had authority to accept notice as the
mayor's agent8 on a statute requiring the city attorney to notify the
mayor of all important matters.' Thus, the court reasoned that the city
would be advised of the claim, thereby permitting ample opportunity for
investigation of the occurrence.1"
In the initial proceedings Mrs. Galbreath alleged that while deposit-
ing mail at a poorly lit corner she stepped into a hole in a sidewalk and
was seriously injured. Her husband called the police, who inspected the
site and stated that a barricade would be erected until repairs were made
and that a report would be referred to the legal department." Mr. Gal-
breath then telephoned the City County Building, was referred to a legal
department official, and later sent him a letter explaining the accident.
Subsequently, Mrs. Galbreath sent a registered letter to the legal depart-
ment explaining her injuries, and later conferred several times with
representatives from this department.' 2 Despite these steps, the trial court
sustained a demurrer to the complaint on the ground it failed to allege
by such occurrence ... within sixty [60] days after the occurrence complained
of....
The 1967 amendment substituted "civil city or town" for "municipal corporation"
twice in the first sentence, added "or clerk-treasurer" as an official upon whom notice
could be served, substituted "shall" for "must" preceding "be served" in the last sentence,
and made minor word changes throughout. IND. ANN. STAT. § 48-8001 (Burns Supp.
1970).
6. - Ind.-; 255 N.E2d 225 (1970).
7. Id. at - ; 255 N.E2d at 230.
8. Id. at- ; 255 N.E.2d at 229.
9. See IND. ANN. STAT. § 48-1801 (Burns Repl. 1963) which provides in part:
... [the city attorney] shall have the management, charge and control of the
law business of such city and for every branch of its government .... He shall
report to the mayor, in writing, all such matters as he may deem important, and
to the department of finance all judgments for which such city shall be liable.
There is a good reason why the court in Galbreath used a theory of statutory
agency rather than an analogy to the Indiana Rules of Civil Procedure. In Wellman v.
Owensboro, 282 S.W.2d 628 (Ky. 1955) where a plaintiff attempted to apply a proce-
dural rule that service may be made upon a party's attorney, the court quoted "whenever
under these rules" from the rule and held the rule inapplicable to documents required to
be served by statutory authority outside the rules. In addition, Indiana Trial Rule 4.6(A)
(4) limits service to the city attorney to cases where a statute provides for an attorney
to represent the local government organization.
10. - Ind. at- ; 255 N.E2d at 229.
11. - Ind. App.- ; 248 N.E.2d 553, 554 (1969).
12. Id. at -; 248 N.E.2d at 555.
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proper statutory notice was served."3 The appellate court affirmed, relying
upon Indiana precedent. 4
Indiana Precedent
As early as 1848 Indiana municipalities were held responsible to the
same extent as natural persons for injuries occasioned by negligence of
their agents.'5 Thus, a doctrine of municipal tort liability evolved from
common law. Subsequently, Touhey v. City of Decatur6 ignored this
theory by holding that no duty was imposed upon municipalities except
13. Id. at-; 248 N.E2d at 556.
14. Id. at- ; 248 N.E.2d at 558.
15. In Ross v. City of Madison, 1 Ind. 281 (1848), the city was held liable for
negligently erecting and maintaining a culvert in connection with a street which resulted
in water damage to plaintiff's tanning operations. In Higert v. City of Greenecastle, 43
Ind. 574 (1873), where a lot owner constructed a sidewalk under the direction of the
civil engineer of the city, the city was held liabld for injuries resulting from negligent
failure to keep the street in a reasonable safe condition even in the absence of a statute
imposing the obligation of maintaining streets. This duty arose by implication from the
exclusive authority over the streets granted the municipality by the legislature and by
the ample power of taxation granted the city by law. See also Grove v. City of Fort
Wayne, 45 Ind. 429 (1874) and Chattin, Tort Liability of Municipal Corporations in
Indiana, 10 IND. L.J. 329, 332-33 (1935) [hereinafter cited as CHATrIN]. Thus, Indiana
followed the New York common law principle that where a power is given and a duty
imposed, liability arises from the failure to properly exercise the power and discharge
the duty. Ehrgott v. Mayor, 96 N.Y. 264, 48 Am. Rep. 622 (1884). This theory was
criticized on the ground that the municipality could not escape liability by delegating the
exclusive authority over construction or maintenance to a private person; the majority
of states recognized liability for defective streets as an exception to the rule that the
municipality was immune in its governmental functions. See Repko, Legal Commentary
on Municipal Tort Liability, 9 LAW AND CoNTEiup. PRO. 214, 226-27 (1942).
Despite the language in the early cases establishing a broad foundation for municipal
tort liability in principle, Indiana restricted municipal tort liability in later decisions on
the basis of the governmental-proprietary distinction, recognizing liability in regard to
streets as an exception. See Green, Freedom of Litigation (III), 38 ILL. L. Rxv. 355, 363
and CHATTIN sutpra, at 332. The distinction originated in Stackhouse v. City of Lafayette,
26 Ind. 17 (1866) where the question was whether the city was liable for the unskillfull
construction of a culvert by a railroad for its own use simply because it was on one of
the public streets. The existence of the street had no relation to the injury, and the court
merely limited the Ross case to situations where the city had directed the construction of
works for public use. However, the broad language was ignored in favor of the dictum.
See Brinkmeyer v. City of Evansville, 29 Ind. 187 (1867) and City of Indianapolis v.
Williams, 58 Ind. App. 447, 108 N.E. 387 (1914).
Thus it appears that after a vigorous pioneer judiciary had established the
liability of municipal corporations on the same basis as other corporations,
false doctrines of immunity based on a groundless dictum were dragged into the
common law to save municipal corporations from liability in thousands of cases
in which individuals or private corporations engaged in the same activities
might have been held liable. Green, supra at 359.
16. 175 Ind. 98, 93 N.E. 540 (1911). The court held that a detailed account of the
time, place, and nature of the injuries published in two newspapers of general circula-
tion was not compliance with the statute, and that plaintiff's physical incapacitation was
irrelevant. IND. ANN. STAT. § 8962 (Burns 1908) was basically the same as the
current statute, but dealt only with defective streets, alleys, highways and bridges.
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as set forth, either expressly or impliedly, by statute."7 In effect, the case
gave impetus to a policy of tort immunity for municipalities. Under
the Touhey holding statutory notice provisions were not an aberra-
tion of common law liability. Rather, such provisions became a mandatory
limitation on the city's statutory liability: a condition precedent to a
right of action against the city." Even though the appropriate municipal
officers obtained full knowledge of the time, place and nature of the injury
a right of action did not arise unless the notice provisions were strictly
complied with.'" The court gave no reasons for this harsh rule which for
sixty years established an often insurmountable block to potential plain-
tiffs.
In 1941, Aaron v. City of Tipton2° presented an opportunity to
eradicate the Touhey rule. The issue in Aaron was whether a failure to
verify the notification rendered the notice insufficient and thereby pre-
cluded plaintiff's cause of action.2' The court refused to apply the strict-
compliance rule, and reasoned that the statute merely established a pro-
cedural step necessary to the common law remedy, not a condition pre-
cedent to the liability.22
Indiana cases prior to Aaron had formulated the test that content
requirements were satisfied when there was substantial compliance with
the statute..2 3 The appellate court in Galbreath declined to extend this
17. 175 Ind. 98 at 100-01, 93 N.E. at 541.
18. Id., 93 N.E. at 542.
19. Id. at 103, 93 N.E. at 542. This is the general doctrine of the states. See Mc-
QuILiN § 53.154.
20. 218 Ind. 227, 32 N.E2d 88 (1941).
21. Id. at 237, 32 N.E.2d at 92. The court held that the Act of 1935, IND. ANN.
STAT. § 48-8001 (Burns Repl. 1963), which eliminated the requirement that the notice
be verified, was applicable to notices served prior to its effective date. Since the liability
was at common law, a change in the procedural step in the remedy could not affect any
vested right of the appellee.
22. Id. at 235-36, 32 N.E.2d at 89-90. Aaron noted that Toulhey used authority from
states having statutory liability.
23. A listing appears in the appellate court opinion, - Ind. App. at- , 248
N.E.2d at 557-58. These cases followed the first case applying the substantial compliance
concept to the notice statute, City of East Chicago v. Gilbert, 59 Ind. App. 613, 108 N.E.
29 (1915), which dealt with the sufficiency of the description of place of injury. The
court said the requirements as to notice of time, place and nature of the injury were to
receive a liberal construction, and relying on Touhey, stated that the requirements that
notice be given, within the time specified, and to proper officers were to receive a strict
construction. Gilbert justified liberal construction of the contents of notice by relying
upon non-Indiana cases favoring such construction when by any reasonable interpreta-
tion the notice could be found in substantial compliance with the statute. The sufficiency
of notice was tested by the statutory purpose. Judd v. City of New Britain, 81 Conn.
300, 70 A. 1028 (1908). The policy was to avoid turning the statute into a pitfall for
claimants who had made a bona-fide effort to comply or deprive them of a right of action
for failures which caused the municipality no disadvantage. Hammock v. City of Tacoma,
40 Wash. 539, 82 P. 893 (1905). Hammock relied on Born v. City of Spokane, 27 Wash.
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substantial compliance doctrine to situations where the correct official
does not receive notice.2" Aaron was not read as totally rejecting the
Touhey strict-construction theory. Instead, the court limited the liberal
construction established by Aaron to insufficient contents of notice.22
Judge White's dissent provided the foundation for the plaintiff's
later success at the supreme court level. He argued that the city attorney
is an agent of the mayor and service upon the former constitutes sub-
stantial compliance with the statutory requirements.2 ' The supreme court
declared that Touhey was no longer the law in Indiana. The Aaron
procedural interpretation of the statute was applied to the requirement of
service on the statutory officials. Though no previous Indiana case had
applied the substantial compliance doctrine where there was a failure to
notify the proper officials, the court stated:
However, given the reasons and purpose of the notice require-
ment as set out [in Aaron], we can see no logical basis upon
719, 68 P. 386 (1902), a case which held that reasonable compliance with the notice
provisions was all that was required. No notice at all was served, but the court held that
if it appeared it was impossible for the claimant to comply within the time prescribed he
would not be held to a literal compliance with the provisions of the law, since if he were it
would work a miscarriage of justice. Impossibility was a question of fact for the jury.
Pearll v. Bay City, 174 Mich. 643, 140 N.W. 938 (1913) was the basis for the recent deci-
sion in Meredith v. City of Melvindale, 381 Mich. 572, 165 N.W.2d 7 (1969) which rea-
soned that only sulstantial compliance with the provisions is necessary, since the layman
with a valid claim should not be penalized for a technical defect. The court made no dis-
tinction between content and service of notice, but rested entirely on whether the statutory
purpose, to reveal sources of information, had been satisfied. The city abandoned its posi-
tion relied upon in the trial court that the plaintiff failed to serve notice upon the proper
party; the city admitted that if service upon the city attorney were the only defect, it
would be compelled to concede it constituted substantial compliance with the requirement
of service to the "mayor, city clerk, or member of the city council." Thus, the cases
Gilbert relied upon show little basis in policy for limiting the doctrine. But see Sollen-
berger v. Incorporated Town of Lineville, 141 Iowa 203, 119 N.W. 618 (1909), where
parol evidence was held insufficient on the ground it would negate the statute's require-
ment of written notice.
24. Id. The court found no case where this liberal construction had been extended
to requirements governing the manner of serving notice, and relied upon City of Rush-
ville v. Morrow, 54 Ind. App. 538, 101 N.E. 659 (1913), where notice to the city attorney
was held insufficient on the basis of Touhey, even though he promised to read it to the
mayor and city council.
25. - Ind. App. at - , 248 N.E.2d at 558. Plaintiff also contended that the city
had actual notice and had waived the notice requirements. The appellate court reaffirmed
the Touhey holding that actual knowledge was irrelevant, since statutory requirements
were not waivable. The court noted that this is the policy of the majority of states.
See Annot. 65 A.L.R.2d 1278 (1959). The Indiana Supreme Court, though discarding the
theoretical base of Toithey, did not consider the waiver issue.
26. Id. at-, 248 N.E.2d at 559. Judge White justified extending the substantial
compliance doctrine by noting that under Toulhey's concept of statutory liability notice
requirements are construed strictly against the claimant, while under Aaron's common
law theory they are construed against the municipality. If Touhey were abandoned, the
stare decisis effect of City of RushilAle would vanish.
"SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE"
which this distinction can rest, nor has this court ever recogn-
ized such a distinction in its holdings.27
To ascertain the implications of Galbreath, an examination of the
policies favoring the traditional distinction between the requirements for
contents of notice and those for recipients is warranted. Furthermore, a
determination of the limits of "substantial compliance" and the effect a
procedural construction will have on the statute's constitutionality is
essential to an understanding of Galbreath.
Policy Governing the Distinction
Between Content and Service
Galbreath emphasized that the statutory purpose must be satisfied
to have substantial compliance.28 Judge Hunter stated:
The purpose of the notice statute being to advise the city of the
accident so that it may properly investigate the surrounding
circumstances, we see no need to endorse a policy which renders
the statute a trap for the unwary where such purpose has in fact
been satisfied2
Prior appellate court decisions had applied a similar test to the sufficiency
of the contents of the notice, but had given no policy reason for so limiting
the doctrine." Moreover, application of substantial compliance policy to
the entire Indiana statute was foreclosed to appellate courts prior to
Aaron because of Touhey; hence, in order to apply the policy, they were
forced to limit it to the contents of the notice. The procedural interpre-
tation of Aaron made expansion of the policy possible, yet Galbreath
was the first decision to do so,"' finding support in a District of Columbia
27. - Ind. at- , 255 N.E.2d at 229.
28. The court quoted the purpose as set out in Aaron:
... to inform the city officials with reasonable certainty of the time, place,
cause and nature of the accident and the general nature and extent of the
injuries so that the city might investigate all facts pertaining to its liability and
prepare its defense, or adjust the claim. 218 Ind. at 231, 32 N.E.2d at 89.
29. - Ind. at- , 255 N.E2d at 229.
30. City of East Chicago v. Gilbert, 59 Ind. App. at 622, 108 N.E. at 32 (1915),
stated it as:
If the statement so designates the place that the officers of the town, being men
of common understanding and intelligence, can, by the exercise of reasonable
diligence and without other information from the plaintiff, find the exact place
where it is claimed the damage was received, it is in this respect sufficient
because it fully answers the purpose of the statute.
This statement avoided allowing outside information which was barred by Touhey
and was relied on by the appellate courts. See e.g., Gary v. McNulty, 99 Ind. App. 641,
194 N.., 193 (1935).
31. The procedural interpretation of Aaron implied that all the requirements of
the statute were in derogation of the common law, so that courts should construe them
433
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case.
In Stone v. District of Columbia,2 like Galbreath, notice was de-
livered to the legal department rather than the designated statutory
official. This procedure was held "equivalent" to the required process.3"
However, Judge Prettyman, dissenting, suggested a claim might require
action by many city departments, and thus the decision hindered the
ability of the designated statutory officials to channel various claims to
appropriate departments."4 These contentions deserve analysis.
Claims investigation necessitates cooperation between other city
offices and the legal department, because the former may have special
facilities for receiving information which the legal department cannot
obtain independently. 5 However, the first responsibility for investigating
a claim and judging its merits falls on the city attorney. Consequently,
he is in the best position to coordinate and evaluate the actions of other
departments. Efficient division of municipal responsibility is inconsistent
with burdening other departments with independent and unnecessary
investigative functions.
Though the legal department is the logical recipient of notice, the
Stone dissent claimed the statutory official should have discretion to
channel claims for other reasons. One channeling function is to direct
appropriate departments to eliminate the risk which caused injury. 7 In
Galbreath, police arranged for a barricade, but the Stone dissent claimed
that nothing short of delivery of notice to the named statutory official
could guarantee elimination of the hazard." Indiana has provided for
this contingency through a statute requiring the city attorney to report
against limiting the common law. However, Gilbert was still cited after Aaron by the
appellate court decisions. These cases, like Gilbert, dealt with the contents of notice.
City of Gary v. Russell, 123 Ind. App. 609, 112 N.E.2d 872 (1953), held that a type-
written signature was sufficient compliance with the statute; City of Logansport v. Gain-
mill, 128 Ind. App. 53, 145 N.E.2d 908 (1957), dealt only with the sufficiency of the place
of injury, as did Volk v. City of Michigan City, 109 Ind. App. 70, 32 N.E.2d 724 (1941).
32. 237 F.2d 28 (D.C. Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 934 (1956). See Nbte.
Municipal Corporations-In an Action For Unliquidated Damages Against a Munici-
pality, Statutory Requirement of Notice to Highest Official of the Municipality is
Satisfied by Notice Given to the Legal Officer, 45 GEo. L.J. 708 (1957), for a background
of District of Columbia cases.
33. 237 F.2d at 29-30. The District of Columbia statute, D.C. Code § 12-309 (1966),
required notice to the District Commissioner.
34. Id. at 34.
35. David & French, Public Tort Liability Administration: Organization, Methods,
and Expense, 9 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROB. 348, 350 (1942) [hereinafter cited as PUBLIC
TORT LIABILITY].
36. REPORT, supra note 4, at 254.
37. 237 F.2d at 33. See David, Tort Liability of Local Go'vernme t: Alternatives
to Immunity from Liability or Suit, 6 U.C.L.A.L. Ev. 1, 32 (1959).
38. 237 F.2d at 34.
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to the mayor all matters he deems important. 9 He is unlikely to overlook
his duty to report hazards not within his authority to rectify, since a
continuing risk threatens additional litigation. If he does neglect his duty,
he must answer to the mayor.
Another channeling function is to determine potential financial
liability for budgetary purposes."0 The number of adverse judgments
and settled claims determines this liability.4' Since the city attorney is best
qualified to evaluate the likelihood of success in either instance,42 it
serves no purpose to insist upon the statutory official's discretionary
power to channel claims. Moreover, the claim is usually "channeled"
to the city attorney anyway,43 and any additional "channeling" can be'
accomplished when necessary once the mayor is informed.
Judge Prettyman also contended Stone's substantial compliance
doctrine substituted a general doctrine of equity, non-prejudice and
acquired knowledge for plain and specific requirements.44 Judge Danaher,
in a separate dissent, expressed the same fear:
[The court's] opinion says that so long as the District can
prepare its defense, it is "most unreasonable" to require a
sufficient notice. Such reasoning would sustain any claim,
39. See note 9 .supra. Thus, cases like Gilkey v. City of Memphis, 159 Tenn. 220, 17
S.W2d 4 (1929), which held notice to the city attorney insufficient notice to the mayor
on the theory that the purpose of the statute was that there be in the mayor's office a
written record of the claim, are not persuasive authority.
40. 237 F.2d at 34. PUBLIc TORT LIABILITY, supra note 35, at 351. REPORT, supra
note 4, at 253.
41. Fuller & Casner, Municipal Tort Liability in Operation, 54 HI v. L. REv. 437,
455 (1941).
42. Id. at 447.
43. Id. at 446.
44. 237 F2d at 34-35. He argued that bther jurisdictions had applied substantial
compliance only in cases dealing with the particularity of the description of the accident
or with some trivial variation in service. Gilbert was cited as the best expression of the
former.
Actual receipt of the notice of claim by the designated official through intermediaries
was accepted as compliance with the statute as long ago as 1899. In Missano v. Mayor of
New York, 160 N.Y. 123, 54 N.E. 744 (1899), actual receipt by the corporation counsel,
the statutory official, was held sufficient though notice was filed with the comptroller.
Although the court said the direction of the statute must be strictly followed, it reasoned
that the provision affected not the cause of action, but the remedy by regulating the
procedure; it was not so rigid as to invalidate notice actually received merely because
it was received through another official. Soper v. Greenwich, 48 App. Div. 354, 62 N.Y.S."
1111 (1900), held notice sufficient when mailed to the town clerk or town board, of
which the supervisor was a member, and actually received by him. The court said the
statute must be substantially complied with, and where an effort to comply was made
and the notice when reasonably construed accomplished the object of the statute it was
sufficient. The actual receipt doctrine is now incorporated in N.Y. GEN. MuN. LAw
§ 50-e (McKinney 1965), providing the party in interest has the claimant examined.
Prettyman arged that this substantial compliance doctrine should not be expanded
to allow omission of specific requirements.
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whether in writing or not, no matter what the source of the
District's information, no matter when the suit is brought.4"
This judicial fear of usurping legislative power"8 and a related
desire to make the limits of substantial compliance certain,47 may explain
Galbreath's care to base the legal department's authority on statutory
delegation.4" However, the opinion contains language4" which indicates
45. Id. at 32.
46. Blair v. City of Fort Wayne, 51 Ind. App. 652, 98 N.E. 736 (1912, and People
v. City of Valparaiso, 178 Ind. 673, 100 N.E. 70 (1912), argued that it is for the legisla-
ture to delineate what exceptions will be allowed. Cardozo expressed the same thought
while Chief Judge of the New York Court of Appeals: "The Legislature has said that
a particular form of notice, conveyed with particular details to particular public officers,
shall be a prerequisite to the right to sue. The courts are without power to substitute
something else." Thomann v. City of Rochester, 256 N.Y. 165, 172, 176 N.E. 129, 131
(1931). See also City of Knoxville v. Felding, 153 Tenn. 586, 285 S.W. 47 (1926) and
Reid v. Kansas City, 195 Mo. App. 457, 192 S.W. 1047 (1917).
In Indiana, the statute has been construed as to the contents in the past, so it is
unrealistic to say it is plain and unambiguous and not capable of construction; the
question is rather, why construction should not also be applied to the service requirement.
47. See Van Alstyne, Claims Against Public Entities: Chaos in California Law,
6 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 205, 208 (1959) : "Such provisions, being fundamentally procedural in
nature, should conform to the desiderata of simplicity and effectiveness which society
has a right to expect of the means by which legally recognized rights are enforceable."
In Cole v. City of St. Joseph, 50 S.W.2d 623 (Mo. 1932), substantial compliance
was held inapplicable to service of notice, since notice statutes must be uniform and
definite in order to achieve their purpose. See Salhr, Tort Notice of Claim to Munici-
palities, 46 Dicic. L. REv. 1, 10 (1941) :
To permit any departure from its clear terms is to introduce into it an element
of uncertainty, and to open the way for a complete breaking down and nulli-
fication of the statute; and instead of having a uniform interpretation applicable
to all cases, there will be no settled rule. As a consequence, the courts will be
called upon, over and over again, to determine whether upon the facts in each
particular case the statute has been substantially complied with, or its spirit
and purpose subserved, thus leading to endless confusion.
48. If the case is limited to its facts in the future, statutory authority to act on
behalf of statutory officials may be required to prove the statutory purpose has been
satisfied. But Galbreath is a laudable move to eliminate inequities which result from
strict construction of the statute, and there is no reason to limit that policy to statutory
officials. The mayor's power to delegate authority and the power of city officials to
waive notice provisions are problems only under a strict construction theory. Arguments
for disallowing waiver-that a law established for a public reason cannot be contravened
by private agreement, Aune v. City of Mandan, 167 N.W2d 754 (N.D. 1969), that the
mayor cannot waive notice by exercising a power not conferred upon him, White v
Mayor and City Council of Nashville, 134 Tenn. 688, 185 S.W. 721 (1916), that the city
will be put to the annoyance and expense of litigation at the mayor's whim, Fisher v.
City and County of Denver, 123 Colo. 158, 225 P.2d 828 (1950), and that such practices
will result in favoritism, scandal, and political manipulation, McCarthy v. City of
Chicago, 312 Ill. App. 268, 38 N.E.2d 519 (1941)-are not persuasive since the mayor
has power to settle claims and the notice statute is procedural. Farrell v. Placer County,
23 Cal.2d 624, 145 P.2d 570 (1944).
Even in states with strict construction, courts have asserted power to determine
what constitutes "delivery" to the mayor, using the test of whether notice is relinquished
into his control. Powers v. Kansas City, 224 Mo. App. 70, 18 S.W.2d 545 (1929), City
of Tulsa v. Whittenhall, 140 Okla. 160, 282 P.2d 322 (1929).
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the doctrine may be extended to include receipt of notice by officials with
no legislative authority, oral notice, late filing, or even no notice at all. A
broad reading of Galbreath indicates the court espoused a doctrine
analogous to harmless error.5" Under such a reading, a plaintiff who
fails to notify the named statutory official will not be denied a remedy
unless the city is prejudiced. As a result, courts will protect the city's
interest without hindering legitimate claimants who are unaware of the
proper procedure. A logical corollary to Galbreat 's recognition that
notice requirements are a procedural limitation on plaintiff's common
law right, is that the city should bear the burden of proving it has been
prejudiced."1
Of course, for statutory officials to have adequate opportunity to respond to claims,
it may be necessary that the official receiving notice have authority to act on their
behalf. See McQuILLIN, § 53.156; Quinn v. Graham, 428 S.W.2d 178 (Mo. App. 1968);
and, Heck v. City of Knoxville, 249 Iowa 602, 88 N.W.2d 58 (1958).
The legislature has recognized administrative problems by limiting the number of
officials designated to receive notice. However, per se rules based on delegation of
authority sacrifice equitable results for a desire for predictability which serves neither
the claimant's nor the city's interest.
Even if Galbreath is confined to its facts, actual receipt of written notice by the city
attorney through another city office or other indirect means will not be an extension of
the holding. See Hirshfield v. District of Columbia, 254 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
49. See text accompanying note 29 supra.
50. See Fmn. R. Civ. Poc. R. 61 and IND. R. Ploc. T.R. 61 which provide: "The
court at every stage of the proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the proceed-
ing which does not affect the substantial rights of the parties." Such a doctrine differs
from one of the traditional escape mechanisms from the statute, equitable estoppel, in
that the claimant need not rely on affirmative actions of the city to be excused from
compliance. See Rabinowitz v. Town of Bay Harbor Islands, 178 S.2d 9 (Fla. 1965).
51. The precedent of Indianapolis v. Evans, 216 Ind. 555, 24 N.E.2d 776 (1940)
that notice must be alleged in the complaint or be insufficient on demurrer was followed
without regard to Aaron!s theory. See March v. Town of Walkerton Electric Depart-
ment, 135 Ind. App. 30, 191 N.E.2d 519 (1963) and Wellmeyer v. City of Hunting-
burg, 139 Ind. App. 64, 213 N.E.2d 709 (1966). Several cases, however, noted that
Aaron made the rule doubtful law. In Lynch v. City of Terre Haute, 123 Ind. App. 282,
109 N.E.2d 437 (1952) the court held insurance obtained by the city did not abrogate the
notice requirement, and held a demurrer properly sustained where the complaint alleged
on its face that no notice was given. But the court expressed doubt that, under Aaron,
failure to allege notice would have been sufficient to sustain a demurrer, though it was
not necessary to decide. See also Hardebeck v. City of Anderson, 137 Ind. App. 455, 209
N.E.2d 769 (1965) where the policy of Aaron was applied to the requirement that notice
be proven where notice had not been formally introduced into evidence.
Ordinarily it is not necessary for the plaintiff to show that a cause of action is not
barred by the statute of limitations, and it must be affirmatively pleaded by the defend-
ant with specific facts stated, rather than a mere reference to the statute or a general
denial. But when a statute creates a cause of action and contains a limitation on its
enforcement, it may be considered a limitation on the right itself, barring the right as
well as the remedy; thus the plaintiff will be required to plead facts showing his case is
within the terms of the statute. See CLAnK, CODE PLEADING § 96 (2d ed. 1946) and
Littel, A Comparison of the Statutes of Limitations, 21 IND. L.J. 23, 27 1945). A
more plausible reason is that statutory rights of action are disfavored to the extent of
burdening the plaintiff with pleading and proving the additional operative facts. The
only really adequate ground for permitting demurrer in these actions is that there are
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The city's reliance on the literal terms of the statute when the
statutory purpose has been served penalizes unwitting claimants and
grants special immunity to the city for no reason. Such a result is incon-
sistent with the trend towards abolition of governmental tort immunity,52
which is based on the realization that the city is the best loss-shifter
through taxes and insurance. Nor will the city have to bear increased
administrative costs; it is not forced to use more effort to learn of claims
under an equitable theory, because recovery will only be allowed when it
has received the benefit of the statute. Finally, the argument that such
an equitable theory, in effect, judicially repeals the statute ignores the
fact that all of the underlying reasons for the statute must be met before
the court permits recovery.
There remain, however, situations where an application of the
purpose test set forth in Galbreath will result in hardship to individual
claimants. These situations give rise to problems such as inaccurate
information and conflicting accounts of the occurrence. For example,
actual knowledge by the city of circumstances surrounding an injury is
not notice that the injured person intends to present a claim for damages."8
Therefore, city officials are not given an opportunity either to settle the
claim or prepare a defense. If the party is an infant or incapacitated, the
situation is compounded," because officials may not even have knowledge
usually no exceptions by which a plaintiff might excuse delay and the exceptions of the
general statutes of limitations do not apply. See Atkinson, Pleading the Statute of
Limitations, 36 YALE L.J. 914, 927 (1927). The effect is to prevent plaintiffs recovery in
any case. The principal differences are procedural; to say that the limitations of special
statutory actions bar the right as well as the remedy is not a reason for different pro-
cedural treatment, but a conclusion that a difference will be made. Id. at 937.
Under Galbreath the statute is no longer recognized as creating a cause of action,
nor as barring the right. There is no reason to disfavor the right when municipal tort
immunity is rejected, and under a general equitable theory there are many excuses and
exceptions possible. Thus, no matter what rationale is used to justify the difference in
treatment, it is no longer acceptable under Galbreath.
Admittedly, such a doctrine may undercut the city's reliance and repose interests,
since the notice statute will no longer be uniformly applied. See note 47 supra. However,
attorneys are familiar with the notice requirements, thus, this equitable approach for
nonrepresented victims who fail to follow the proper procedure will apply to only a
small fraction of possible suits.
52. See generally, Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 YALE L.J. 1 (1924);
Borchard, Governmental Responsibility in Tort VI, 36 YALE L.J. 1 (1926) ; Borchard,
Governmental Responsibility in Tort VI, 28 CoLuir. L. REv. 577 (1928) ; REPORT, supra
note 4; Note, The Decline of Sovereign Immunity in Indiana, 36 IND. L.J. 223 (1961) ;
Comment, Governmental Tort Liability, 23 IND. L.J. 468 (1948) ; and Brinkman v. City
of Indianapolis, 141 Ind. App. 662, 231 N.E.2d 169 (1967).
53. Thomann v. City of Rochester, 256 N.Y. 165, 176 N.E. 129 (1931). See 76
CONG. REc. 3988 (1933) (remarks of Rep. Stafford).
54. See David, Tort Liability of Local Government: Alternatives to Liability or
Suit, 6 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1, 34 (1959). This problem has been solved by statute; see
N.Y. GEN. MuN. LAW § 50-e(5) (McKinney 1965). Under the Touhey theory infancy
or incapacitation of the plaintiff was no defense. See People v. City of Valparaiso, 178
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of the defect causing the injury.
Under the Galbreath rule, all these claimants would be denied
recovery, since the city has been prejudiced by the claimant's failure to
comply with the statutory notice requirements. However, a recent Michi-
gan Supreme Court decision has taken the position that municipalities no
longer need the protection afforded by a sixty day notice requirement. In
Grubaugh v. City of St. Johns55 a minor plaintiff failed to give the
required statutory notice. He claimed it would be a denial of due process
to deny him recovery for such failure, since he had been rendered
physically and mentally incapacitated by the accident. The court instead
held the notice provision violative of due process of law because it served
no useful purpose:
In recent years most governmental units and agencies have
purchased liability insurance as authorized by statute. . . . In
addition to insurance investigators, they have police departments
and full-time attorneys at their disposal to promptly investigate
the causes and effects of accidents occurring on streets and
highways. As a result these units and agencies are better
prepared to investigate and defend negligence suits than are
most private tortfeasors to whom no special notice privileges
have been granted by the legislature.5"
This rationale applies with equal force to competent adults as to
minors or those suffering legal disability or physical incapacity.57 The
Galbreath court's care to allow relief when the statutory purpose was
Ind. 673, 100 N.E. 70 (1912). When the action was based on preexisting common law
right, Sherfey v. City of Brazil, 213 Ind. 493, 13 N.E.2d 568 (1938), extended the
Touley reasoning to common law actions. The court concluded that even common law
actions are subject to statutes of limitations, but the logic is questionable since statutes of
limitations are subject to exceptions.
55. 384 Mich. 165, 180 N.W.2d 778 (1970).
56. Id. at- , 180 N.W.2d at 784. Indiana has a similar statute. IND. ANN. STAT.
§ 39-1819 (Burns Repl. 1965). The court reasoned that the right of action, though
statutory in origin, was a vested right which could not be deprived the plaintiff without
due process of law. The notice requirement was arbitrary and capricious, since it served
no useful purpose, and the arbitary extinguishing of plaintiff's remedy thus deprived him
of his property without due process of law. In the process, the court overruled Moulter v.
City of Grand Rapids, 155 Mich. 165, 118 N.W. 919 (1908), a case which Touhey had
relied upon, which held that the legislature which created the right of action could attach
any limitations it chose, and the question of reasonableness was not for the courts. The
argument would apply with even more weight in Indiana, since Galbreath has recognized
the right to sue municipalities in tort as a common law right.
57. Id .at -, 180 N.W2d at 787 (Brennan J, dissenting). The court disposed of
the case on the basis of plaintiffs right to due process, but refused to discuss whether the
requirement violated the equal protection clauses of the state and federal constitutions
in all cases: "Such questions will undoubtedly arise in some new case where a fully
competent adult is the victim."
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served avoided the constitutional issue." However, should Indiana courts
evaluate the historical purposes of the Indiana statute when situations
arise where the city has been prejudiced,59 they may likewise find it
violative of the due process clause. Although the Michigan court did not
substantiate its premises, the arguments used are those advanced in the
movement to abolish governmental immunity."0 Indiana is committed
58. Touhey held the statute did not violate the 14th amendment to the Federal
Constitution or Article 1, § 23 of the Indiana Constitution prohibiting the granting to
any citizen or class of citizens privileges and immunities which do not equally belong to
all citizens upon the same terms, because a liability created by the legislature could be
qualified, limited, or removed by them. 175 Ind. at 100-01, 93 N.E. at 542. Gribben v.
City of Franklin, 175 Ind. 500, 94 N.E. 757 (1911), held the statute did not violate
Article 4, § 22 prohibiting local or special laws regulating the practices in courts of
justice, since it had nothing to do with practice but was a condition precedent to the
right of action. Since Galbreath affirmed that the right of action against the city is a
common law right, a distinction exists between those having common law rights against
a city and those possessing common law rights against others. Only if the classification
is based on substantial distinctions for a valid reasonable purpose can the statute be other
than arbitrary and capricious. See Note, Municipal Corporations-Torts-Power to Re-
strict Liability for Injuries from Defect in Sidewalk, 51 Haizv. L. REv. 1301 (1938).
In Lorton v. Brown County Comm. Unit School Dist. No. 1, 35 Ill.2d 362, 220 N.E2d
161 (1966), the Illinois Supreme Court held a notice statute applying only to negligence
in schools invalid as special legislation, because no such notice requirement existed as to
similar municipal corporations, and thus the act provided procedures applicable to some
and not others under substantially like circumstances with no discernible reasons. For
the background of this development, see Note, Torts-Governmental Immunity-
Special Procedural Requirements Unconstitutional, 17 DEPA.uL L. Rnv. 236 (1967).
59. It has been suggested that when municipal tort liability is expanded, notice
requirements are even more essential to protect municipalities against stale and fraudulent
claims. See Sahm, Tort Notice of Claim to Municipalities, 46 DIcK. L. RFv. 1, 11 (1941)
and Note, Tort Actions Against Municipalities-Desirability of Uniform Period Follow-
ing Accident Within Which Notice Must be Given, 24 VA. L. REv. 86, 88 (1937).
Otherwise, the city may not know of an accident until the claimant files suit, when
witnesses are scattered and information hard to obtain. See REo0T supra note 4, at 250.
See also Public Tort Liability, supra note 35, at 350. However, the purposes of the statute
are the same as the purposes of general statutes of limitations. See generally, Littel,
A Comparison of the Statutes of Limitations 21 IND. L.J. 23, 24 (1945). The question is
whether the city still needs a shorter period of time than any other tortfeasor.
60. Municipal liability is a matter of policy, in whatever form it takes:
On the one side is the interest of the taxpayers, who ultimately bear the burden
when the municipality is held liable, and the interest of the state in having
certain functions ,adequately carried out without interference. On the other
side is the interest of the individual in freedom from losses caused by the
torts of the municipality. See CHATTIN note 15 supra, at 332-33.
See Green note 15, supra at 379-81 where he argues that the same policy which
would protect municipalities from payments of tort damages would be equally applicable to
protect private corporations; that taxation is not the subject matter of judicial concern
when justice to the individual is involved; that groundless claims can be dealt with by the
courts without "burning the ship to get rid of the rats"; that the arguments favoring
immunity are like the parade of horribles in early tort cases, thrown in because there
was nothing better at hand, and that immunity was the result of a dominating desire for
municipal adequacy and efficiency for the benefit of the whole group at the expense of
the individual:
Now, however, that municipalities have grown stronger and are more securely
organized, now that their activities have expanded far beyond their original
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to the trend away from governmental tort immunity,61 and it is question-
able whether notice statutes, a remnant of the days of tort immunity,
should continue to be applied. Notice statutes were merely a means to
retain some municipal tort immunity in the areas in which liability was
allowed.
Of course, if the public cannot afford the necessary machinery to
deal with claims on the same basis as any other tortfeasor, the hardship
to the community may outweigh the benefits of protecting individual
rights. 2 However, empirical studies have shown it likely that cities
receive more efficient legal services than the average plaintiff. Public
attorneys rapidly become specialists in tort practice, with legal depart-
ments devoting their entire attention to tort claims; consequently, they
may possess the principal facts necessary to defend an action even
before the plaintiff has consulted a lawyer or collected evidence."8 These
studies do not substantiate the fear which has upheld immunity since its
inception. The basis of liability applicable to private corporations should
give municipal corporations all the protection they require.6"
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functions, now that doctrines have been developed through which the hurts
and dangers incident to their activities can be handled with some success, now
that the public attitude for the protection of the individual has radically changed,
these early doctrines of immunity appear foolish, and the courts in seeking to
administer them at the expense of the victims cannot escape the indictment that
they are failing to perform their functions.
61. Brinkman v. City of Indianapolis, 141 Ind. App. 662, 231 N.E.2d 169 (1967).
62. Fuller & Casner, Munzicipal Tort Liability in Operation, 54 H- v. L. Rnv. 437,
445 (1941).
63. Id. at 446-47.
64. See Green supra note 15, at 381.
